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Ethics, Economics and AIDS Policy in 
South Africa 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This evening’s lecture is about the economics of AIDS policy in South Africa.  
But, as one of my colleagues in the Politics Department wryly observed, a 
lecture on the government’s AIDS policy would be ‘rather short’.  So, I will 
also be using the topic to touch on the role of the economist in society and on 
good and bad uses of economics per se.    
The fundamental problem addressed by economics is scarcity.  
Economists typically point to opportunity costs and budget constraints – thus 
earning the discipline its reputation as the ‘dismal science’.  Yet this role of 
slayer of unfeasible dreams and proponent of almost Victorian notions of 
‘good housekeeping’ is an important one.  As McCloskey, the foremost critic 
of economic rhetoric, argues, we can all learn a ‘thing or two about ethics 
from economists’… (most notably that)…`bourgeois values have their value 
and that we must be grown-ups and face scarcity when after all it exists’ 
(1990: 147-8). 
This ‘ethical lesson’ about scarcity appears to be well (albeit not 
universally) accepted in South Africa today.  In spite of grumblings from the 
trade union movement about ‘neo-liberalism’, opinion polls consistently show 
that most South Africans believe government spending is constrained, and that 
there are no easy means of expanding available revenues.  This has made it 
easier for the government to pursue economic strategies which reduce, rather 
than expand, government spending.    
The theory (or what McCloskey would call ‘the story’) behind the 
government’s economic strategy goes something like this: ‘Once upon a time 
there was a wise government which realised that increased spending leads to 
inflation, high deficits and irritable investors.  So, they cut government 
spending.  This pleased investors, so investment increased, jobs were created 
and everyone got richer.’ 
 
McCloskey accuses economists of peddling ‘snake-oil’ – i.e. magical 
cure-all solutions – when they tell stories like this.  And there are many such 
snake-oil cures in economics.  The crude Keynesian alternative goes 
something like this:  ‘Once upon a time there was a wise government which 
realised that the economy was stuck in a low-level trap because there was not 
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enough spending power.  So they increased the fiscal deficit to boost 
government spending.  This injection of demand increased sales and 
employment – and everyone got richer.’ 
Keynesian stories, having fallen into disrepute during the inflationary 
1970s, have experienced something of a comeback.  It has, for example, 
become respectable to recommend that the Japanese government radically 
increase spending to kick-start its sluggish economy.  But in South Africa, 
such Keynesian policy prescriptions remain the preserve of the marginalised 
left.   
Here is the best Keynesian riposte I have seen to the South African 
government’s economic policies.  It is in the form of a poem by Jeremy 
Cronin (1997: 34): 
 
 
 
Epitaph for a Finance Minister 
 
 
Grounded, here lies our beloved minister 
Propagator of the Passenger 
Theory of Propulsion 
 
He asked us to tighten belts  
Not because of, but in order to 
Take off 
 
 
 
Neoclassical economists of course disagree that fiscal discipline 
amounts to no more than an ineffectual ‘passenger theory of propulsion’.  
They argue that saving (i.e. belt-tightening) is a precondition for investment 
and growth.  But I have yet to see a neoclassical economist write poetry as 
well as Jeremy Cronin.    
The clash of divergent theories and approaches in economics has 
resulted in a fair amount of ridicule being heaped on us economists.  The 
media complains about the confusing array of economic opinions.  Here is a 
typical example of how it teases economists:   
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Our students are often impatient with the many theories, desiring to 
learn just one correct interpretation of how the world ‘actually works’.  But 
unless we respond with simple snake-oil stories, we cannot meet this request.  
Often the only intellectually respectable thing to do is to open their eyes to 
complexity and equip them to be sceptical of all easy answers – or as my 
mother (also an economist) used to say, teach them ‘to beware of economists 
bearing gifts’.    
Yet economics used well (and with a self-critical modesty) can offer 
society real help in coming to grips with hard choices, but only if it informs – 
rather than substitutes for – social debate.  This means being honest about the 
assumptions that guide economic analysis, and avoiding the confusing jargon 
so characteristic of the profession 
   The rhetoric of economic expertise is seductive because it functions as a 
marker of professionalism for those who use it - but the price of such 
pretension is often a failure to communicate.  And, when politicians engage in 
the rhetoric of economic expertise, there is a real danger that social debate and 
dissent may be crushed entirely by the sheer force of  language.  
For example, our Finance Minister – the one whose epitaph Jeremy 
Cronin has helpfully provided – is fond of statements such as ‘the economic 
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fundamentals dictate the need for further fiscal discipline’.  The rhetorical 
devices he uses help to silence criticism.  After all, who wants to argue against 
something as worthy as ‘discipline’ – particularly when it is ‘dictated’ by a 
‘fundamental’ (whatever that means – I certainly have no idea).  
Statements like ‘the provision of anti-retroviral drugs is not 
affordable’ have a similar effect.  The use of the gnomic present – ‘is not 
affordable’ – conveys to the listener a sense of timeless truth.  McCloskey 
argues that this discursive sleight-of-hand is typical of the narrative of 
economic expertise: ‘The experts claim that their stories are “positive, not 
normative”, “is ” instead of “ought” the way things are as against how they 
should be.  The claim is at the centre of modernism.  But stories carry an 
ethical burden.  Concealing the ethical burden under a cloak of science is the 
master move of expertise, the secret ingredient of the snake oil’ (1990: 35).   
 
As I will argue tonight, precisely such an ‘ethical burden’ lurks 
behind the government’s claims that anti-retroviral therapy for HIV+ pregnant 
women is not ‘affordable’ or ‘cost-effective’.  These terms are more than 
technical labels (as economic technocrats would have us believe) – they are 
symbols of a prior – and highly contestable – process of choice and analysis.  
 
Economic models of choice typically show how an optimal 
distribution of scarce resources can be achieved – given a set of assumptions 
and information about social preferences.  Such models can be used to 
allocate labour and food in a prison camp just as easily as reallocating tax 
revenues from the rich to the poor.  Social objectives, values and preferences 
enter the calculus in the form of variables that can be changed with the stroke 
of a pen.  This is why social control over economic decision-making is so 
vitally important.   
But how can economists behave in ways that support rather than 
erode social control?  I believe this can be achieved in two ways.  Firstly, 
economists can explain the nature of an existing choice, thus inviting a 
discussion about which social values to include.  Secondly, they can analyse 
choices that have already been made – thereby holding a mirror up to society 
and saying: ‘This is the choice that was made – and the implicit assumptions 
which guided it.  Do you like them?’  Both these roles are pertinent when it 
comes to allocating scarce resources in the health sector.  
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Allocating Scarce Resources in the Health 
Sector 
 
This can be illustrated by an anecdote about a specialist I know who works in 
a large public hospital in Cape Town.  One day, a young man in his early 
twenties was admitted with gun-shot wounds to the ches t.  He stood a good 
chance of recovery – but required time in the intensive care unit (ICU) to 
recover.  My friend took the unconscious man to the ICU, where he met 
another specialist, with an elderly and very ill patient, also looking for an ICU 
bed.  But there was only one available.  This was scarcity in stark clarity – and 
the two medics had to decide how to allocate the scarce resource – i.e. the bed.  
My friend immediately argued (according to the old World War 1 
principle of triage) that his patient was more likely to recover, and had more 
years of life ahead of him, and so should get the bed.  The other specialist 
countered this by pointing to the gang-tattoos on my friend’s patient.   
`Your patient is a gangster,’ he said.  ‘He is a threat to society, a no-
good bum, whereas my patient is a loving grandmother.’   
A passing orderly overheard the conversation and came over to 
examine the gangster.  He raised the unconscious man’s arm and pointed to 
the row of seven crosses tattooed on his side.  
‘Kyk daar,’ he said, ‘it means this skollie has killed seven people.’ 
‘It probably also means,’ added the specialist with the elderly patient, 
‘that there are at least seven vengeful gangsters out to get him.  Your patient’s 
life-expectancy is probably no better than my patient’s!’ 
My friend could see that the case was swinging sharply against him, 
so he changed strategy:   
`I refuse to engage in amateur sociology!’ he yelled.  ‘This is a young 
man who will recover if you give him an ICU bed – that is all we should be 
considering here!’  
The tactic worked.  The gangster got the bed and recovered shortly 
thereafter, and the grandmother died that evening.   
 
But all was not well with my friend.  He was plagued by remorse and 
anger – worried that he may well have brought about a socially inferior 
outcome, and angry that he had been forced to argue one way or the other.   
‘Surely you economists should be helping us out,’ he said.  ‘What we 
need is a flow chart to help us manoeuvre our way around these ethical 
choices and dilemmas.’ 
 
Can economists provide any help in such situations?  Well, a few 
guidelines can perhaps be gleaned from health and welfare economics.  For 
example, a popular measure used by health economists for ranking medical 
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interventions is the number of ‘disability-adjusted life years’ (or DALYs) 
saved. The DALY calculation takes years of life saved by a health 
intervention, and then weights them according to age and disability (Murray 
and Acharya, 1997).  This means that a year of life saved for a disabled person 
counts for less than one saved for an able-bodied person, and a year saved for 
a middle-aged person counts for more than one saved for a child or an elderly 
person.     
While the ethical basis of the DALY is questionable, supporters of 
the DALY (which includes the World Health Organisation) claim that the 
measure reflects underlying social norms.  Indeed, age-weighting was implicit 
in my friend’s argument in favour of giving the bed to the young man rather 
than the grandmother.  
 
But what about the argument made by the other doctor – i.e. that 
gangsters have less of a moral claim on treatment than grandmothers – simply 
because they are gangsters?  Can and should social attitudes towards 
categories of people – such as gangsters – be incorporated in a DALY-type 
calculation?    
I discussed this question over tea one day with the department’s 
resident welfare economist.  He rose to the challenge by suggesting that we 
include a further weighting which gives a ‘social score’ to the patient.  
Depending on social preferences, this score could range from 0 in the case of 
gangsters to 1 in the case of upstanding social citizens.   
Such a scoring system could possibly allocate higher values to those 
with dependants than those without, and some occupations may be ranked 
higher than others.  Some of my colleagues agreed with the general notion of a 
social score – although one pointed out that an occupational ranking was 
probably not a good idea.  ‘Think about it,’ he warned us, ‘which are the three 
most reviled occupations?  Lawyers, politicians and economists! – I am not 
sure we really want to pursue this idea!’ 
More seriously, you will have noticed that there is something 
unsavoury about including a ‘social score’ in a model for making choices.  It is 
the kind of thing that gives economists a bad name.  Yet value-judgements 
already pervade decision-making explicitly through the use of the DALY 
formula that effectively discriminates against the disabled, the very young and 
the elderly.  My colleague’s suggestion of a social score is in fact an invitation 
to discussion – a challenge to society to formulate all the values/prejudices that 
either should, or should not, enter into a decision-making process.   
 
But what if social discussion results in an unjust outcome?  Is there 
not a case for removing some decisions from the public domain?  It is, after 
all, accepted in most liberal democracies that just because a belief is widely 
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held, it does not necessarily mean that it should determine policy.  Banning the 
death penalty, despite widespread public support for it, is a case in point.  
Does this not, perhaps, imply that economic decision-makers should take their 
cues from some moral philosophy and not from public opinion?  
Amartya Sen, the greatest living welfare economist, has devoted a lot 
of energy to this issue.  I was fortunate enough to have attended his lectures as 
a graduate student.  One lecture stands out in my memory.  He began the class 
by presenting us with a dilemma rather like the one faced by my specialis t 
friend:   
A doctor in India is called out to a far-distant village because a child 
is sick and in need of immediate treatment.  He gets there, and finds two sick 
children – but has only enough medicine to cure one.  He is faced with the 
following choice:  treat both (with a much reduced chance of survival for both) 
or treat one – and if the latter, which one?  He makes inquiries about the 
personal circumstances of the children (the income of their household, their 
school marks, disabilities, the occupation of their parents etc.) and then tries to 
decide what to do.     
‘Can welfare economics help the doctor make the decision?’ Sen 
asked the class.  We hazarded a few guesses as to which factors should be 
prioritised.  Some of us evoked Rawls’ ‘maximin principle’ (1971: 152-7) – 
which suggests that we should maximise the welfare of the worst-off – to 
argue that the child from the poorest household should be saved.  Others 
suggested that the child with the greatest expected life-time income (proxied 
by school-marks and social class) should be saved.   
Sen put up with our musings for a short while, and then exploded in 
irritation.   
‘I don’t want to hear which child you would save!’ he said. ‘It is not 
your role, or the role of the doctor to decide on such matters.’  He glared at us.  
‘Economists must never play God,’ he said.  ‘There is no way of deciding 
which child to save.’ 
We looked at him cautiously.   
‘But then what should the doctor do?’ asked someone eventually.   
‘He must ask the family and community leaders whether he should 
try and save both, or just one,’ replied Sen.  ‘If they tell him to save one, then 
he should ask which one.  The decision must be theirs.  Only they can decide 
what to do.’   
 
Sen was arguing that economic decision-making should not be 
biased by any underlying moral philosophy, that it should remain cold and 
clinical, and that all moral choices have to be made by society – whether just 
or not.  He was, in other words, insisting that economic decision-making 
comply with society’s ‘revealed preferences’ – warts and all.   
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        However, such an approach immediately begs the question as to how 
decisions are actually made in society.  Does the structure of authority and 
accountability ensure that the ‘general will’ prevails?  Economists are not 
well-equipped to answer such questions.  But by exposing which value-
judgements prevail – and showing how these impact on social choice - the 
economist can help provoke a general discussion about values and decision-
making procedures.   This is what I mean by ‘holding up a mirror to society’ 
and inviting discussion.  
 
In Sen’s example, the problem was framed in terms of allocating a 
scarce resource between people with identical needs.  In almost all cases, 
however, the choice is among people needing different kinds of treatment – 
and with different resource implications.  The problem of maximising the 
number of DALYs or lives saved thus becomes one of maximising the number 
of DALYs or lives saved per Rand spent.  This is the typical measure of ‘cost-
effectiveness’ in the health sector.  But here too, there is a heavy hidden 
ethical burden that requires closer examination and public discussion.  I will 
now demonstrate this using the case of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
 
 
The ‘Cost-Effectiveness’ of Reducing Mother-to-
Child Transmission of HIV in South Africa 
 
Babies born to HIV+ mothers have a high risk of contracting HIV.  
Fortunately, there is a wealth of scientific evidence to show that treating 
pregnant women with a short course of anti-retrovirals can dramatically reduce 
mother-to-child transmission.  Yet (with the exception of the Western Cape) 
the government is not making use of this technology – justifying its inaction 
primarily on the grounds that these programmes are ‘unaffordable’. 
This is a classic example of an apparently ‘technical’ statement 
which in reality is little more than a dubious economic story.  This can be 
shown by a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation: 
Assume we have 1000 pregnant women.  Twenty-three percent (230 
women) are likely to be HIV+.  Of these, 28% will transmit the HI virus to 
their babies if nothing is done to prevent it.  This will result in 64 HIV+ 
babies.  
There are various interventions that can reduce mother-to-child 
transmission. I am going to discuss the following three treatment programmes:    
· A short course of AZT (administered from 36 weeks into the 
pregnancy and then three-hourly during birth) and the mother 
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continues to breastfeed;  
· A short course of AZT (as above) but the mother feeds her baby 
with formula for six months rather than breastmilk; 
· A dose of Nevirapine (and the mother continues to breastfeed).1 
(All these treatment regimes include dose of Bactrim syrup for child) 
 
As can be seen from the table below, AZT combined with formula-
feeding is the most expensive mother-to-child-transmission reduction 
programme and Nevirapine is the cheapest.   At present Nevirapine costs less 
than R30 an intervention – and would cost nothing if the government accepted 
the manufacturer’s offer of providing the drug free of charge.  In this 
calculation, Nevirapine is costed at R0. 
AZT with formula-feeding is the most expensive programme – but it 
is also the most effective because it saves the most lives.  So, how does one 
choose between the options?  The standard approach is to use a measure of 
cost-effectiveness – i.e. cost per life.  As can be seen from the table, the 
Nevirapine option is ‘optimal’ in that it results in the lowest cost per life saved.  
This is simply because Nevirapine is so cheap compared to the alternatives 
that this more than compensates for the fact that it does not save the most 
lives.   
This raises some interesting ethical questions about using this 
measure of cost-effectiveness as a decision tool.  Consider for the moment the 
two treatment regimes using AZT.  For an extra R435 per child saved, one 
could save 25 more children if the more expensive programme (AZT with 
formula-feeding) was selected.  Under such circumstances, choosing the 
‘technical’ solution of AZT and breastfeeding because it is ‘cost-effective’, 
may not be socially optimal.  If the choice was to come under social scrutiny, I 
would be willing to bet that the option of spending R435 more per saved child 
in order to save double the number of children, would be the preferred option.  
This is why social scrutiny of ‘technically efficient’ solutions is so important. 
Now consider the choice between the Nevirapine intervention and 
the AZT plus formula-feeding option.  This time, if one wanted to maximise 
the number of children saved, the fifteen extra children saved by the AZT plus 
formula-feeding programme would come at a cost of just over R4000 more 
per saved child.  Perhaps this relatively high cost was one of the reasons why, 
when the government was considering a mother-to-child transmission 
prevention programme, that it opted for Nevirapine rather that AZT?  
However, as even this intervention appears to have been halted (while the 
cabinet reconsiders the programme) the issue remains moot. 
                                                                 
1
 This analysis draws on the methodological approaches developed in 
Nattrass (1998), Skordis (2000) and Skordis and Nattrass (2001).  
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Assume 1000 pregnant women. 
23% will be HIV+                           
= 230 women 
Without treatment, 28% of these 
women will pass the HI virus to 
their babies     = 64 babies 
AZT and 
breast-
feeding 
AZT and 
formula 
feeding 
Nevirapine and 
breast feeding 
Cost of the treatment programme 
for an HIV+ woman and her baby 
R371* R993** R26*** 
Cost of 1000 HIV tests & 
treatment programmes for 230 
HIV+ women   
R121 330 R264 390 R41 980 
Reduction in HIV transmission 
from 28% to: 
17% 6% 13% 
Number of HIV+ babies drops 
from 64 to: 
39 14 29 
Number of children saved  25  50  35 
Cost (HIV tests and treatment 
programme) per child saved 
R4 853 R5 288 R1 200 
Hospital costs for HIV+ 
babies**** 
R468 000 R168 000 R348 000 
Total costs (1000 HIV tests, 230 
treatment programmes & 
hospital costs for all HIV+ 
children) 
R588 330 R432 390 R389 980 
    
Hospital costs for the 64 babies 
who would have been born 
HIV+ in the absence of a 
programme 
R768 000 R768 000 R768 000 
Amount saved by the intervention R179 670 R335 610 R378 020 
*Includes the cost of AZT (R345) administered from 36 weeks into the pregnancy and 
then 3 hourly during labour, and Bactrim syrup for the child (R26) 
** Includes the cost of AZT (R345), Bactrim syrup (R26), 40 minutes of counselling 
(R22), formula feed, bottles etc.  (R600). 
*** Assumes that Nevirapine is free, the only cost being Bactrim syrup (R26). 
****  The R12 000 is an estimate of the cost of 12 days’ hospitalisation for an HIV+ 
child during its life.  It does not include the cost of medication for treatment of illness. 
NB: Basic costs and statistical probabilities are drawn from references in  Skordis 
(2000). 
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But this ‘cost per saved child’ measure is limited because it does not 
include the cost to the health sector of those babies born HIV+ despite the 
treatment programme.  These children will not thrive, will require frequent 
medical attention and will die before their fifth birthday.  The medical costs of 
caring for them should thus enter into the calculation.  Given available 
evidence (see Skordis, 2000), one can estimate conservatively that each HIV+ 
child will visit a hospital twelve times during the course of its life, costing the 
state about R1000 a visit.  Once we factor in these costs, the AZT plus 
breastfeeding option suddenly becomes more costly to the state than the AZT 
plus formula-feding – simply because the breastfeeding regime results in so 
many more HIV+ children than the formula-feeding regime. Notice also that 
Nevirapine remains the cheapest intervention, but the difference between it 
and AZT plus formula-feeding is far closer than it had appeared previously.  
Under such circumstances, society may well opt for the more expensive option 
because it is only marginally more costly, yet saves substantially more lives.  
  
The national government’s current position is that none of these 
programmes is affordable.  Dr Simela, the Director responsible for HIV/AIDS 
policy in the Department of Health, wrote the following in an article published 
in the Mail and Guardian last year:  ‘For those who have to find equitable, 
cost-effective and sustainable solutions, the luxury of cherry-picking remains 
the domain of researchers.  The health sector needs to respond to the needs of 
not only HIV+ women and their infants, but to the needs of all people who 
have HIV related medical problems, as well as other South Africans who have 
non-HIV related medical problems ‘ (Mail and Guardian, 28 July 2000). 
 
On the face of it, this is a reasonable claim.  The argument is that 
those pushing to save children from HIV are effectively a single-issue lobby 
group, and that the government has the more difficult task of balancing the 
entire spectrum of competing claims.  Note that the argument also implicitly 
says that only the government has ‘the big picture’ – thus effectively silencing 
those who argue that the costs of the intervention are ‘relatively low’.     
The problem with the Director General’s argument is that it does not 
take into account that preventing mother-to-child transmission means less 
pressure on the health system because there will be fewer children requiring 
treatment for AIDS-related illnesses.     
As mentioned earlier, 64 children will be HIV+ if no programme to 
prevent mother-to-child transmission is put in place.  The costs to the health 
sector are thus 64 multiplied by R12 000, which is R768 000.  As can be seen 
from the table, this exceeds the total costs to the health sector if a mother-to-
child transmission programme had been in place.  Indeed, the government will 
save money by saving children from HIV infection.   
  
12 
This example shows how a broader and (more appropriate) 
discussion of costs results in radically different policy conclusions from the 
conventional measure of cost-effectiveness.  It illustrates the importance of 
keeping a critical eye on tools of economic analysis. 
 
So far, the cost discussion has been presented in terms of 1000 
pregnancies.  Jolene Skordis (one of our star graduate students) has produced a 
more concrete analysis by calculating the actual number of pregnancies and 
HIV cases each year under different treatment regimes.  As can be seen from 
the table below, an AZT plus formula-feeding regime could save about 45000 
children each year, at a cost of 1,6% of the Health Budget.  This is broadly in 
line with other South African studies showing that mother-to-child 
transmission reduction programmes would cost less than 3% of the Health 
Budget (see overview in Geffen 2001).  Notice that the Nevirapine 
intervention is only marginally less costly than the AZT and formula-feeding 
option.  This is because the cost of caring for the extra HIV+ children born 
under a Nevirapine programme almost swamps the cost advantage of the free 
drug.     
 
Jolene’s study is original and important because she takes the further 
step of comparing the cost of the intervention with the costs of not intervening.  
Using available demographic and medical data, she estimated that it costs the 
government about R856 million a year in hospital costs for HIV+ children.  As 
this exceeds the health costs of all the treatment regimes, it follows that it 
saves the government money to save the children – rather than to let them get 
sick and die from AIDS.   This devastates the Director General’s argument 
about affordability. 
 
There are, of course, various objections to this kind of costing 
exercise.  One is that it does not take into account the costs of orphans.  When 
asked why the government was not intervening to prevent mother-to-child 
transmission, the late Presidential Spokesman Parks Mankahlana replied:  
‘That mother is going to die and that HIV negative child will be an orphan.  
That child must be brought up, who is going to bring that child up? It’s the 
state, the state.  That’s resources you see’ (Presidential Spokesperson Parks 
Mankahlana quoted in the American Magazine Science, and reported in the 
Mail and Guardian, 5/8/2001.) 
 
Remarks such as these give the impression that the government is 
deliberately trying to reduce the number of AIDS orphans by ensuring that as 
many of them as possible contract HIV.  No wonder that the Mail and 
Guardian observed in an editorial that the government ‘should not be 
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surprised to hear charges of genocide directed against it’ (21 July 2000).   
 
The problem of orphans is certainly going to increase significantly as 
deaths from the AIDS pandemic escalate. But this does not constitute an 
econmic argument in favour of killing off as many orphans as possible.  
Firstly, the vast majority of orphaned children is cared for by their extended 
families – and not by state institutions. Increasing the number of HIV+ 
children simply places extra burdens on these families. 
But it also increases the level of unproductive expenditure by the 
state.  The most common form of state support for these children is the child 
support grant which, in the case of a child with a normal life expectancy, can 
be regarded as a form of investment in human capital.   However, when spent 
on an HIV+ child who is likely to die before its fifth birthday, the child grant 
can only be regarded as an unrecoverable form of consumption spending.   
 
 
The Health Cost of Doing Nothing in South Africa  
(J. Skordis)                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 AZT and 
Breast-
feeding 
AZT and 
Formula-
feeding 
Nevirapine 
and Breast-
feeding 
Lives saved by the programme to 
reduce mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV 
22 800 44 900 31 400 
Total health costs (i.e. costs of 
the HIV tests, the treatment 
programme and costs of 
treating HIV+ children) 
R676 mil R508 mil R495 mil 
Total costs as % of health budget 2,13% 1,60% 1,56% 
    
Cost of treating all HIV+ 
children born assuming no 
intervention to reduce mother-
to-child transmission of HIV  
R856 mil R856 mil R856 mil 
    
Amount saved by the 
programme 
R180 mil R348 mil R361 mil 
Amount saved as a % of the 
health budget 
0,57% 1,10% 1,14% 
Source: Mid-point estimates from Skordis and Nattrass (2001). 
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Secondly, emerging anecdotal evidence suggests that orphans are 
more likely to be abandoned to state institutions by their extended families if 
they are HIV+ than if they are HIV–.  Taken together, this suggests that the 
government could end up spending more on institutional child welfare than 
would be the case the case if a programme to reduce mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV had been in place. 
Another objection is that our calculations assume that the 
government will actually treat HIV+ children.  If hospitals are instructed not to 
treat HIV+ children then clearly it would pay the government to let the 
children die rather than to save them.   
Costa Gazi, the fearless medic who has waged a war against the 
government over its failure to prevent mother-to-child transmission, made this 
objection to me at a recent conference.  He reported that the Pediatric Ward at 
Dora Nginza hospital outside Port Elizabeth only allows each HIV+ child one 
hospital admission during its lifetime.  HIV+ children continue to be treated 
for opportunistic infections, but all care has to be home-based.  I responded by 
pointing out that even if a child spends only one day in hospital and is given 
over R200 worth of drugs to fight opportunistic infections at home,  it will still 
be more cost-effective for the state to administer Nevirapine than to do 
nothing.  
Costa Gazi does not need to be convinced of the advantages of 
administering Nevirapine.  He has been administering Nevirapine to HIV+ 
pregnant women for some time now – and paying for the medicine himself.  
He has been helped in this endeavour by various donations, and hindered 
rather than helped by the Ministry of Health.  His moral stand has exposed the 
inadequacy of the government’s response to HIV and challenges the 
government to do better.  
A similar challenge pervades the cost-effectiveness calculations I 
have presented here.  The conclusion that ‘it costs the state more to treat HIV+ 
children than it does to save them from HIV’ is not a statement about an 
objective reality (although it sounds like it).  Rather, it is a conditional 
conclusion that reads: ‘unless the government has decided not to treat HIV+ 
children, pediatric costs will exceed the costs of reducing mother-to-child 
transmission.’   The not-so-subtle charge against the government thus 
becomes: ‘Either you have not done your economic calculus properly, or you 
have decided not to treat the HIV+ children – which is it?’  This is the kind of 
‘reverse engineering’ of choices that economic analysis can do in order to 
provoke critical engagement.      
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Conclusion:  Cost-Effectiveness and Treatment 
for People Living with AIDS 
 
In many ways, reducing mother-to-child transmission of HIV is the easiest 
AIDS policy case to argue for.  It is harder (but certainly not impossible) to 
argue for generalised access to chronic anti-retroviral treatment for those 
already infected with HIV.   
Over the past two years, AIDS drugs have fallen by about 80% in 
price and could fall further if the government imports generic drugs or 
negotiates more effectively with the large pharmacutical companies (Andrews, 
2001).  According to information from Medscheme, the price of dual therapy 
(i.e. a cocktail of two anti-retrovirals) has dropped from about R20000 to 
R3360 per annum, and the price of triple therapy (a cocktail of three anti-
retrovirals) has dropped from over R36000 to just under R7788 per annum 
(Regensberg, 2001).  
If one includes the costs of two CD4 tests and two viral load tests per 
year, then the entire treatment regime for someone on state-of-the-art triple 
therapy comes to just over R800 per month.  As Medscheme, which runs an 
‘Aid for AIDS’ programme, has shown, this is in the same ball-park as many 
chronic conditions (such as high blood pressure, high cholesterol, non-insulin 
dependant diabetes, etc.) currently routinely paid for by medical schemes.  For 
those whose CD4 count falls within the 200-350 range, triple therapy can 
extend their survival from 4 years to over 10 years (Regensberg, 2001). 
This is good news for people living with HIV/AIDS who also happen 
to belong to medical aid schemes.  But what about all those who do not?  For 
them, the only hope is the state – and the government is understandably 
reluctant to commit the substantial resources needed to fight the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic with triple therapy.    
But just as costs saved need to be taken into account when looking at 
the economics of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, so too should they be 
taken into account when examining the cost-effectiveness of anti-retroviral 
therapy as a long-term treatment option.  Here are some of the ways that an 
anti-retroviral treatment campaign can reduce costs for the government.   
 
· An HIV+ person on anti-retrovirals has a lower chance of 
passing on the disease (therefore there will be fewer new HIV+ 
cases and lower associated medical costs). 
· The possibility of treatment will encourage more people to be 
tested and to receive post-test counselling – which in turn should 
help change behaviour and reduce the incidence of new HIV 
cases (and their associated costs). 
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· HIV+ people on anti-retrovirals have a lower incidence of 
opportunistic infections (therefore the costs of treating such 
infections will be lower). 
· HIV+ people on anti-retrovirals can continue to look after their 
children.  The costs of child-support will thus be lower, and the 
problem of AIDS orphans will be reduced.   
· HIV+ people who are employed will continue to work and firms 
will be saved the costs of replacing and retraining such workers.  
This will impact positively on profitability and hence on 
government tax revenue. 
 
In other words, once one adopts a broader notion of cost-
effectiveness, it may well be the case that the costs of not treating HIV+ 
people exceed the costs of treating them.  Students are beginning to work on 
this issue and I am looking forward to their results.  
 
Note that I have said nothing yet about the value of a human life.  My 
calculations have simply looked at the government’s balance sheet.  Justice 
Edwin Cameron, South Africa’s highest profile HIV+ activist, places the value 
of human life and dignity at the centre of his argument in favour of providing 
anti-retrovirals to those who need them: ‘The calculus of disease and death 
from AIDS renders all the evasive counter-rhetoric dramatically unconvincing.  
None of it is persuasive when the brute fact is brought home that life is 
available and within reach, but is being denied to those who crave it’ (2001: 6-
7). 
 
His challenge to society is to grasp the nettle of the value of a human 
life and put that into the calculation as well.  Rather than look at the health 
costs alone, society should be asking why we are spending money on 
armaments rather than on saving the lives of those with AIDS; on a 
presidential jet, rather than anti-retrovirals,; etc.  It is  to the great credit of 
organisations like the Treatment Action Campaign – which is challenging the 
government in court over its mother-to-child transmission policies – that these 
questions are beginning to be posed in the public arena.   
Once the debate moves beyond the narrow bounds of the health 
budget to include questions about the size and allocation of the government 
budget, the economic calculus expands to include macro-level dynamics.  
How government policy affects the generation of income and wealth – and 
thus the resources available for redistribution by means of taxation and 
government spending – becomes pertinent to the cost-effectiveness 
calculation.   
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In my opening remarks, I pointed out that there were rival economic 
narratives and that South Africa’s economic policy makers were peddling a 
‘belt-tightening’ variety of economic snake-oil.  But what if those punting 
fiscal austerity are wrong – as Keynesian critics have been maintaining for 
some time now?  What if, instead of cutting the fiscal deficit, we had increased 
taxation and borrowing in order to finance a coherent national AIDS treatment 
programme?  How would that have filtered through the economy?   
Would investors have been put off by the increase in the deficit (as  
is assumed by the government’s economists) or would they have been 
impressed by the dedicated and professional response to a national health 
emergency?  Would businesses have been annoyed by the lack of tax relief, or 
would they have been relieved by the fact that fewer of their workers were 
taking sick leave and subsequently dying?  Would national savings have been 
lowered by the increased demands of government borrowing, or would 
national savings have been raised because less money would have been spent 
by people on funerals and on rushing sick children and adults to hospitals and 
clinics?   
There are no simple answers to these questions.  But that does not 
mean that such questions should not be asked.  Indeed, the horror and 
suffering of South Africa’s AIDS crisis requires that we challenge the entire 
spectrum of government’s economic choices and strategies. 
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